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    Weaponry: mapping global dynamics

    Between dependence, autonomy and power projection, arms flows shape the contours of state influence and sovereignty on the global chessboard.

    16 February 202610 min read
    Weaponry: mapping global dynamics

    For a political unit, acquiring military capabilities is part of asserting sovereignty and positioning itself within regional or global competitive dynamics. Weaponry is an instrument for imposing one's will through the use or threat of force, but also for protecting oneself against it. The circulation of weapons therefore cannot be considered neutral, since it contributes to building up a political unit's capabilities. In this context, what do arms flows reveal about global geopolitics?

    Do arms imports make states dependent?

    To carry weight on the international chessboard, two aspects of weaponry must be considered: its technological level and its deployment capacity. The strategies adopted by states vary according to how they combine these two parameters. However, it can prove difficult, particularly for small political entities, to achieve a high level of performance across all capability areas. Importing provides access to larger volumes and to more advanced technologies than those available domestically. It is often simpler to acquire a high-tech component than to develop an equivalent research and production capacity. Moreover, these imports remain closely tied to political relations between states. Rival states generally refrain from supplying each other with equipment that could strengthen the adversary's military capabilities. Arms transfers thus follow logics of political alignment. Although conditioned by political understandings, these exchanges also reflect power relations. The importing state may find itself dependent on its partners, and any change in political alignment is likely to affect the supply or maintenance of the equipment acquired. The American company Lockheed Martin is a good example of this dynamic. The company is among the leading exporters of combat aircraft thanks to the F-35 Lightning II, selected by the United States and 19 allied nations according to Lockheed Martin. This aircraft requires regular software updates, and access to the source code is reportedly, according to many observers, reserved for the United States and the manufacturer. Purchasing states therefore do not have full control over the system. If the partnership were called into question, access to updates could be restricted, compromising the equipment's operation. Importing countries benefit from cutting-edge technologies while remaining dependent on the political framework that governs their use.

    Aware of the issues linked to dependence, some states seek to mitigate this imbalance. India ranks as the world's second-largest arms importer, behind Ukraine, between 2020 and 2024, with 8.3% of global imports according to SIPRI. The country reduces its dependence by diversifying its partners through a multi-alignment strategy. This approach allows it both to avoid certain political pressures and to access the most advanced technologies offered by its various suppliers. It also strengthens its bargaining power by putting exporters in competition and building industrial offsets into contracts. For example, in 2005, India concluded an agreement to import six French Scorpène submarines. Production relied on a joint supply chain involving both countries: the Kalvari-class submarines of the P75 programme were built in India, with technology transfer, according to Naval Group. The hybrid nature of the industrial set-up contributed to national development and gave rise to significant technology transfers. Through this approach, India seeks to preserve its strategic autonomy while pursuing its acquisition programmes. Importing arms is not just a matter of more or less pronounced dependence; it also contributes to building up the importing country's capabilities. As noted above, it provides access to advanced technologies and to arms volumes greater than those produced locally. China made extensive use of arms imports, being the world's leading recipient between 2004 and 2008 with 11% of global imports, according to SIPRI. The imported equipment generated technology transfers, which China then reproduced for domestic production. For example, in the early 1990s, China acquired Russian S-300 air defence systems, and its HQ-9 system is often presented as being largely inspired by them. This strategy allowed China's defence industrial and technological base (DITB) to develop and gradually gain autonomy. China has now significantly reduced its purchases of foreign arms through progressive domestic substitution. Between 2020 and 2024, it ranked 16th among importing countries, its imports having fallen by 64% compared with 2015-2019 according to SIPRI. China now seeks to develop its exports and ranks as the world's fourth-largest exporter over 2020-2024, with 5.9% of the total. Importing thus allowed the country to gradually reduce its dependence through technology transfer and the strengthening of its national capabilities.

    Exports: an instrument serving national defence interests

    Depending on the size of the domestic market, as reflected in the defence budget, the DITB is more or less able to meet its needs autonomously. The more developed the national defence industry, the better the balance of programmes and the smooth running of companies are ensured. Conversely, when the resources devoted to defence are limited, the DITB cannot sustain its activity on national orders alone. Once state demand is met, the production chain tends to erode gradually. Many components then disappear from the market, making any restart of production difficult. Maintaining existing equipment also becomes more complex as components and know-how become scarce. Two solutions can be considered. On the one hand, slowing the pace of production to delay the exhaustion of industrial capabilities. On the other, the state can turn to exports, generating new sources of revenue for companies. Opening arms production to international markets is thus a factor in maintaining the performance of the national DITB. For middle powers, exports appear as a lever for supporting national production. However, like imports, exports remain subject to political considerations and depend on diplomatic relations between states. Every export is subject to prior review and is not considered when the state wishes to limit the spread of an advanced technology from which it derives an advantage on the international stage.

    The will to export in support of national defence interests is not enough; the equipment must also be attractive in a global arms competition. Manufacturers tend to specialise in order to increase their competitiveness on the international market. Technologies quickly become obsolete, replaced by competing systems designed to catch buyers' attention. France decided to stop producing its assault rifle, the FAMAS. Its production was no longer competitive on the world market, facing intense competition and a technology outdated by international standards. By ending this production, the DITB focused on higher value-added areas in which it has a technological edge, notably combat aviation and naval equipment. This equipment is more expensive. For example, the Rafale costs significantly more per unit than the Mirage 2000 it replaces. Advanced, more expensive technologies are produced and distributed in smaller volumes. This orientation towards technological competition has consequences for the depth of available forces. It is particularly visible among European nations. The French army is often described as a "bonsai army" to highlight its comprehensiveness at the expense of its mass. A former head of Lockheed Martin gave his name to "Augustine's law" to illustrate this phenomenon, describing an uncontrolled increase in the cost of weaponry while defence budgets grow at a more moderate pace. Although it does not rest on a strict scientific basis, this approach is a useful lens for analysing the evolution of armed forces worldwide.

    Weaponry: a reflection of power hierarchies and strategies

    The United States holds a dominant position in arms exports, accounting for 43% of global exports over 2020-2024 according to SIPRI. Its advanced industry and technological superiority make it an unavoidable player in military equipment flows. This leadership position provides a means of pressure, exercised in particular through the ITAR regulations (International Traffic in Arms Regulations), administered by the State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. Under this standard, no American component, software or data may be integrated into the sale of a product manufactured outside the United States without its authorisation. In other words, the US State Department has a say in approving any export containing an ITAR-controlled element. The United States has also drawn up a list of countries barred from accessing ITAR technologies, such as Iran or China. As a result, any non-American export to these countries incorporating an ITAR component is automatically blocked. In the event of a violation, US authorities can impose heavy financial penalties, as was the case for ITT Corporation, Airbus and BAE Systems. This extraterritorial regulation is a diplomatic instrument serving American power. In response, some companies have developed so-called "ITAR-free" solutions, limiting or excluding the use of components subject to US control. These products are presented as a way of preserving buyers' sovereignty in managing their military equipment. Europe, Russia and China have pursued this objective by developing independent equipment. However, these initiatives remain marginal in a market largely dominated by the United States.

    The choice of client and supplier is, as noted above, closely tied to politics. In this respect, the transfer of military equipment reflects the global geopolitical configuration. In 2017, Turkey signed a contract with Russia to acquire the S-400 air defence system. Although a NATO member, Turkey did not turn to its American or European partners to acquire this system, marking a repositioning of its alliances. In response, the United States sanctioned Turkey under CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act), a US law aimed at penalising countries that cooperate militarily with Russia, Iran or North Korea. Turkey had already been excluded from the F-35 programme in 2019; on 14 December 2020, Washington sanctioned its defence procurement agency (SSB), notably barring it from any US export licence, according to the Congressional Research Service and Air & Space Forces Magazine. These situations underline that arms trade is embedded in power logics on the international stage.

    A state's positioning as an arms importer or exporter is first and foremost shaped by its national ambitions. Following the annexation of Crimea, and reinforced after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the United States imposed financial and trade sanctions on the Russian DITB, with CAATSA explicitly targeting significant transactions with the Russian defence sector. Some clients of the Russian DITB, subject to these sanctions, broke off their contracts, depriving Russia of certain trading partners. In addition, the country saw its access to components essential to building up its capabilities hampered. These decisions, combined with the context of the war in Ukraine, led to a restructuring of the Russian arms industry. Exports fell sharply in order to concentrate production on the needs of Russian forces engaged in Ukraine. According to SIPRI, Russian exports fell by 64% between 2015-2019 and 2020-2024, a decline that began before the full-scale invasion of 2022. Russia's political choices on the international stage have thus led to a reorganisation of exports to meet the needs of its national sovereignty.

    The circulation of defence capabilities helps shape power relations on the international stage. While state strategies differ in their action plans, they converge on the goal of strengthening national power. Arms movements reflect geopolitical dynamics.

    For defence manufacturers, their subcontractors and risk departments, these flows are read on a daily basis: geopolitical monitoring of alignments and breaks in alliances, international sanctions monitoring (ITAR, CAATSA, measures targeting Russia), regulatory monitoring of export controls, technology monitoring of transfers and competing programmes, and supplier risk monitoring of components whose origin determines the freedom to export. The book by Léo Péria-Peigné, a researcher at Ifri, Géopolitique de l'armement (Le Cavalier Bleu, 2024), offers a useful framework for reading these issues.

    Frequently asked questions

    Who are the main arms exporters in the world?

    Over the 2020-2024 period, the United States clearly dominates the market with 43% of global exports according to SIPRI, ahead of France (9.6%), Russia (7.8%), China (5.9%) and Germany (5.6%). Russia has lost a lot of ground, while France has become the world's second-largest exporter.

    Why is India diversifying its arms suppliers?

    To reduce its dependence on a single partner and preserve its strategic autonomy. By putting Russia, France, Israel or the United States in competition, New Delhi obtains better terms, industrial offsets and technology transfers, while limiting its exposure to the political pressure of a single supplier.

    What are the ITAR regulations?

    They are the US system for controlling exports of defence equipment and data. Any product incorporating a component or technology subject to ITAR cannot be re-exported without State Department authorisation, even if it is manufactured outside the United States. This extraterritorial reach gives Washington leverage over its partners' arms sales.

    How did China go from arms importer to arms exporter?

    By importing equipment on a massive scale, mainly Russian, and then building on these acquisitions to develop its own defence industrial and technological base. The world's leading importer between 2004 and 2008, it was only sixteenth over 2020-2024 and now ranks fourth among exporters, with Pakistan as its main client.

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