NewsCore
    AnalyseStratégieSouverainetéChineInfluence

    Chinese debt: the BRI's lever of influence

    75 countries owe China USD 22 billion in 2025, a record. Debt is becoming a lever of geoeconomic influence for Beijing.

    18 February 20269 min read
    Chinese debt: the BRI's lever of influence

    On 27 May 2025 the Lowy Institute published “Peak Repayment: China’s Global Lending”, a landmark report on global debt linked to China. The study shows that 75 countries will have to pay USD 22 billion to Beijing this year, an all-time record. The PRC has moved from the role of lender to that of debt collector, as Al Jazeera summed it up when the report came out, redefining its place in global geoeconomics. Beyond the figures, the issue is power through debt: how indebtedness now structures relationships of influence and dependence.

    From its introduction, the report highlights the critical situation of states whose inability to service their debts has already led to transfers of the usufruct of strategic infrastructure to Chinese players, particularly in South Asia. The case of Sri Lanka is emblematic: its massive indebtedness, recalled by several analyses, led to a loss of control over certain key assets, starting with the port of Hambantota, leased in 2017 for 99 years to China Merchants Port (an arrangement whose reading as a debt-for-asset swap remains disputed, as The Diplomat points out), and illustrates how debt can become a decisive lever of influence. These situations immediately underline the central issue: how indebtedness now shapes relationships of dependence and influence between China and its partners.

    The example of Greece strikingly illustrates the global reach of the phenomenon. At the height of its public debt crisis, as part of the privatisation programme run by the TAIPED fund, Athens sold 51% of the Piraeus Port Authority to the Chinese group COSCO in 2016, a stake later raised to 67%, with a concession running until 2052 according to GTP. This acquisition allowed Beijing to take operational control of one of the most strategic maritime hubs in the Mediterranean. The Greek case shows that China’s ability to convert a debt situation into geoeconomic influence is not limited to the Global South: it now reaches Europe itself. From the outset, this observation underlines the scale of the issue and is a reminder that financial dependence can translate into structural concessions even within the European Union.

    The 2025 Lowy report: an X-ray of a global financial shift

    This study, carried out by an Australian institute, more precisely the Lowy Institute Indo-Pacific Development Centre, and authored by Riley Duke, draws on data from the World Bank Debtor Reporting System and the IMF. Its aim is to measure the shift in China’s role: from global lender to net creditor of developing countries. The report sheds light on flows of financial dependence and areas of strategic vulnerability.

    In 2025, the 75 poorest and most vulnerable countries will have to repay around USD 22 billion of debt to China. This is the largest annual sum ever paid to Beijing. In other words, a significant share of these countries’ national budgets is now devoted to paying the interest and principal owed to China. Moreover, net financial flows between China and the developing world have turned negative: in 2024, China collected around USD 34 billion more than it lent. This is a historic reversal compared with the 2010-2016 period, when its lending far exceeded repayments. The report indicates that Chinese lending peaked in 2016, at more than USD 50 billion. Since then, the momentum has collapsed: since 2023, new commitments have levelled off at around USD 7 billion a year, a fall of more than 85%.

    The report introduces the concept of “peak repayment”, a tipping point at which debt becomes an instrument of control. In reality, Beijing is no longer an expansive lender but a player focused on risk management and recovery, which alters the balance of power. The challenge for China is to protect its financial interests while avoiding the image of a “predatory lender”. The stakes are quite different for indebted states, however: they must manage the contradiction between financial dependence and economic sovereignty.

    Debt as an instrument of influence and vulnerability

    The Lowy report shows that repayments to China exceed those to the Paris Club in 54 of the 120 developing countries for which data exist. As a reminder, the Paris Club includes Germany, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Korea, Denmark, Spain, the United States, the Russian Federation, Finland, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland. In the poorest economies, payments to China account for 25% of total debt service.

    Debt owed to China therefore becomes a lever for political negotiation, particularly through targeted restructurings. Moreover, in many countries more public funds are absorbed by debt service than by essential social spending such as health and education. The countries concerned are seeing an erosion of their strategic autonomy, involving, among other things, financial dependence, diplomatic concessions and loss of assets. Sri Lanka, Zambia and Laos are textbook cases: these countries are trapped between debt and maintaining their political ties with Beijing.

    China’s shift to the role of dominant creditor upends flows of information and power. Debt serves as a tool of discreet influence, a form of financial soft power: pressure without direct interference. The Lowy Institute report notes that China continues to grant new loans to certain strategic countries despite the general decline in overall financing for the project. These include neighbouring countries (Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia) and exporters of critical minerals (Argentina, Brazil, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Indonesia). New challenges for global governance are thus entering the international stage. Among them are transparency, traceability of loans and coordination with the IMF.

    Africa at the heart of the model: dependence, resilience and realignment

    Africa is a textbook example. More than half of the countries most indebted to China are African, according to the Anadolu agency. Africa accounts for a major share of BRI lending for transport, energy and telecommunications infrastructure. The continent’s dependence is explained by the weakness of local capital markets and post-colonial infrastructure needs.

    Several African cases show how China can obtain access to, or operational control of, strategic infrastructure in exchange for massive financing. In East Africa, ports modernised with Chinese capital, such as in Djibouti, often bring Chinese state-owned enterprises into their ownership or operation. The Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway, built under the BRI, was also run by Chinese operators during its first years of operation, before a handover of management to the Ethiopian and Djiboutian companies announced in 2024 (Global Times). These arrangements, covering infrastructure vital to regional trade, show that China does not merely finance: it establishes itself for the long term by controlling the usufruct of key logistics nodes, thereby consolidating its political and economic influence on the continent.

    Repayments to China also weigh heavily on African national budgets and aggravate social tensions that are already very present on the continent. Governments oscillate between strategic cooperation and concern about the loss of economic sovereignty. This is why some countries are seeking to diversify their partners, notably with Turkey, India and other multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the African Development Bank.

    Africa thus illustrates the duality of the Chinese model: a driver of development and a vector of dependence. Beijing has established itself as a central player in African logistics and digital networks, strengthening its political influence. For players on the continent, this is a strategic issue, because they need to identify the vulnerabilities linked to debt and critical infrastructure.

    Towards a reconfiguration of the global debt system

    2025 marks a turning point: China is now the largest bilateral creditor of 53 countries. The Lowy Institute report highlights a duality in the global financial system: on one side, IMF/Paris Club governance and on the other, the China-centred model. The latter is altering the balance of the global financial system. As a result, Western institutions are being sidelined in restructuring negotiations.

    This shift in balance carries systemic risks such as rising debt costs, slower global growth and a potential credit crisis for emerging countries. The issues also include the opacity of Chinese contracts (confidentiality clauses, lack of full reporting), which creates a grey zone in global governance. Without international coordination, the fragmentation of sovereign debt threatens global financial stability.

    Beijing faces a dilemma: recovering its debts without losing its image as a partner of the South. For debtor countries, the challenge is different: they must build a resilience strategy (transparency, diversification, risk monitoring). Monitoring China-centred financial flows is becoming an economic security issue.

    The Australian institute’s report thus confirms a profound geoeconomic shift: China is no longer the engine of global financing but finds itself at the heart of a repayment system, which transforms relationships of dependence and levers of influence: debt becomes an instrument of global power. Analysis of debt flows must now be integrated as an indicator of power and vulnerability. In this new era of “peak repayment”, understanding financial interdependencies amounts to reading the new frontiers of global power.

    Frequently asked questions

    What is the “peak repayment” described by the Lowy Institute?

    It is the point at which repayments owed to China by developing countries durably exceed new Chinese lending. According to Riley Duke’s report published in May 2025, China has moved from the role of lender to that of net creditor: in 2024 it collected around USD 34 billion more than it lent.

    How much do developing countries have to repay China in 2025?

    The Lowy Institute estimates the debt service owed to China by developing countries at USD 35 billion in 2025, of which USD 22 billion is owed by the 75 poorest and most vulnerable countries, a record. For these countries, China accounts for around a quarter of total debt service, ahead of multilateral and private creditors.

    Does China practise a “debt trap”?

    The debate remains open. Cases such as Hambantota in Sri Lanka or Piraeus in Greece show that Chinese financing can lead to control of infrastructure, but these arrangements are often concessions or privatisations rather than direct debt-for-asset swaps. Influence is exerted mainly through the position of leading creditor in restructurings.

    How can a company monitor the risk linked to Chinese debt?

    By cross-referencing signals: sovereign restructurings and defaults, new port or mining concessions, loan agreements with critical mineral exporters, IMF and Paris Club positions. Well-equipped geopolitical and economic monitoring tracks these multilingual sources continuously and raises an alert when a supplier or customer country moves into a risk zone.

    Sources

    Go deeper

    All reports

    Three NewsCore reports that build on this article.