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    China's trade surplus

    China's trade surplus topped 1,000 billion dollars in 2025, a sign of growing dependence on exports in the absence of domestic demand.

    16 February 20268 min read
    China's trade surplus

    In 2025, China's trade balance crossed a historic threshold that speaks volumes about the real state of its economy. For the first time, its trade surplus exceeded 1,000 billion dollars. It had already reached around 1,000 billion dollars over the first eleven months, according to Al Jazeera, and ended the year at 1,189 billion dollars according to Chinese customs data published on 14 January 2026, reported by Reuters and picked up by the New Straits Times. This record, unprecedented in contemporary economic history, places Beijing at the centre of global imbalances and confirms a profound shift in its growth model. Behind this spectacular figure lies a more complex reality. The surplus is not a sign of domestic prosperity but of an economy increasingly dependent on its exports to offset flagging domestic demand. China today exports far more than it imports, not out of internal dynamism, but out of strategic necessity.

    A surplus that reveals a model under strain

    For several years, the Chinese economy has faced a double shock. Externally, the trade relationship with the United States has entered a phase of structural confrontation. Internally, consumption is slowing, youth unemployment remains high and the property sector, a historical pillar of growth, is going through a deep crisis. At the same time, China's domestic economy is struggling to find an autonomous growth engine again. Consumption is not picking up. Households, faced with economic uncertainty and the declining value of their property assets, favour saving. Moreover, youth unemployment fuels lasting distrust about the future: according to National Bureau of Statistics data compiled by Trading Economics, the youth unemployment rate still stood at 18% in September 2026, after a peak of 21.3% in June 2023. Imports of consumer goods are falling, reflecting structurally weakened domestic demand.

    In fact, the property sector, long a pillar of growth, remains the main threat. Residential investment is collapsing, new home sales are declining and the sector's large companies continue to struggle with repeated liquidity crises. For example, the ratio of household debt to GDP in China tripled between 2008 and 2023, rising from around 20% to 60% of GDP according to the private bank Reyl (an observation Kenneth Rogoff also made in the IMF's magazine), which shows the massive build-up of debt linked to the property market even before the current slowdown. Yet property is at once a driver of activity, a pillar of household savings and a funding base for local authorities. Its weakening undermines the whole Chinese economy.

    Faced with this failing domestic demand, Chinese companies are offloading their industrial overcapacity abroad. In November 2025, Chinese exports rose by 5.9% year on year, while imports rose by only 1.9% over the same period. This concerns the automotive sector but also batteries, solar panels, electrical equipment and industrial machinery. China does indeed produce far more than it consumes. The trade surplus thus becomes a macroeconomic stabilisation mechanism, a safety valve for a growth model under strain.

    The US trade war as a catalyst

    To understand this shift, the geopolitical dimension of the Sino-American relationship must be taken into account. Since 2018, the United States has gradually turned trade into an instrument of national security. Tariffs and export controls no longer aim only to correct a trade deficit, but to contain China's technological rise. The year-on-year drop of almost 29% in Chinese exports to the United States, noted at the end of November 2025 by Al Jazeera, testifies to the partial effectiveness of this decoupling strategy. Above all, however, it reveals Beijing's capacity to adapt. In a few years, China has redeployed its flows towards areas less exposed to US sanctions, particularly South-East Asia. For example, ASEAN has become its leading trading partner. Trade with Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia is booming, especially in electronic components and industrial equipment. Chinese exports to South-East Asia were still growing by 8.2% year on year at the end of 2025, again according to Al Jazeera. These countries now serve as an industrial hub allowing Chinese companies to get around some of the US barriers. Ultimately, value chains do not disappear, they move, which complicates the reading of sanctions and export controls for exposed companies.

    Europe at the heart of the trade battlefield

    The European Union has become one of the main theatres of Chinese industrial overproduction. At the end of 2025, Chinese exports to the EU were growing by around 15% year on year according to Al Jazeera. Chinese products (electric vehicles, batteries, solar panels, machine tools, etc.) are rapidly gaining ground on the European market, driven by very competitive prices and a technological upgrade that is now undeniable. This dynamic is fuelling growing concern in Brussels. The European Commission has opened several anti-subsidy investigations, notably in the automotive sector, fearing competition it considers unfair: as early as October 2023, the European Commission launched an investigation into battery electric vehicles imported from China. The debate on the end of free trade is gaining ground.

    The monetary question must also be taken into account. Many analysts believe that the yuan remains structurally undervalued, which gives Chinese industry a massive competitive advantage. The People's Bank of China regularly intervenes to stabilise the currency, but Beijing refuses any sharp appreciation that would penalise its exporters. The exchange rate thus becomes a fully fledged instrument of industrial policy.

    Emmanuel Macron's visit to China in December 2025 illustrates this European ambivalence: according to Le Petit Journal, the French president argued there for a rebalancing of trade, before mentioning on his return possible "strong measures" if Beijing did not reduce its surpluses. Indeed, the European Union seeks to preserve access to the Chinese market while trying to contain an industrial flood likely to weaken its own production capacities. Behind economic diplomacy lies a battle for the survival of certain strategic industries.

    The Global South: new ground for Chinese expansion

    Beyond the major trading powers, China's trade surplus is also redrawing the balances of the Global South. India is seeing its trade deficit with Beijing widen dangerously, fuelling its industrial dependence. Despite its reindustrialisation ambitions, New Delhi remains massively dependent on Chinese machinery and components. South-East Asia, for its part, is establishing itself as a central pivot of China's trade strategy. Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia play a key role in processing and re-exporting Chinese products to Western markets. ASEAN is now China's leading trading partner, ahead of the European Union and the United States. In many emerging economies, China is establishing itself as an indispensable industrial supplier, strengthening its economic and political influence. The surplus thus becomes an economic weapon for China in developing countries.

    What strategic interests for France and the European Union?

    China's trade surplus of more than 1,000 billion dollars is not merely a statistical performance. It is a signal, almost a red warning light. It reveals a Chinese economy increasingly geared towards exports to offset its internal weaknesses. It also demonstrates an industry now capable of competing head-on with Western economies in the technologies of the future. China has turned its exchange rate and its trade surplus into economic weapons.

    For France, the issue is particularly sensitive. China remains an essential market for aerospace, luxury goods, agri-food and services. However, it is also a formidable competitor in strategic industrial sectors such as electric vehicles, batteries, renewable energy and industrial equipment. The question is therefore no longer whether to trade with China but on what terms. Preserving balanced access to the Chinese market must go hand in hand with a genuine policy of protecting European industrial capacities.

    For corporate management, these movements call for continuous tracking rather than an occasional reading of the statistics: economic monitoring of China's foreign trade figures, geopolitical monitoring of trade tensions and retaliatory measures, sector monitoring of exposed industries (electric vehicles, batteries, solar, machinery) and supplier risk monitoring of supply chains that are being redeployed towards South-East Asia.

    In a world where trade is once again a battlefield, the Chinese surplus appears less as an economic success than as the symptom of a globalisation that has entered a new era of geo-economic confrontation.

    Frequently asked questions

    Why did China's trade surplus exceed 1,000 billion dollars?

    Because China is exporting more and more while its imports stagnate. Domestic consumption remains held back by the property crisis and household caution, so manufacturers offload their overcapacity abroad. The redeployment of sales towards South-East Asia, Europe and the Global South has more than offset the decline of the US market.

    What are the consequences for European industry?

    Europe absorbs a growing share of Chinese exports of electric vehicles, batteries, solar panels and machinery, at very competitive prices. The industries concerned are under pressure on their margins and production capacities. Hence the European Commission's anti-subsidy investigations and the debate on firmer protective measures.

    How does China get around US tariffs?

    By redirecting its flows towards third countries less exposed to US measures, notably Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia. These economies assemble, process or re-export products incorporating Chinese components. Value chains do not disappear: they move, which makes it harder to track the real origin of goods.

    Which indicators should be tracked to anticipate changes in trade with China?

    Monthly Chinese customs statistics (exports by destination and by product), the yuan exchange rate, data on Chinese consumption and property, as well as trade defence decisions by the European Union and the United States. Cross-referencing these series with the Asian business press makes it possible to spot turning points earlier.

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